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Bank capital buffers around the world: 
Cyclical patterns and the effect of market power  
 
Abstract 
We examine the effect of competition and business cycles on bank capital buffers around the world. We use a 
dataset of 3,461 banks from 25 developed and 54 developing countries over the 2001-2013 period. Banks tend 
on average to exhibit pro-cyclical behavior. But capital buffers seem to be more pro-cyclical in developing 
countries. Our results show that more competition leads to higher buffers in developed countries but to lower 
buffers in developing ones. This evidence suggests that the “competition-stability” thesis adheres in developed 
economies, whereas “competition-fragility” makes more sense in developing countries. This asymmetric result 
may have important policy implications, particularly with regard to new, globally-negotiated capital adequacy 
standards. 
Keywords: Bank capital buffers; Business cycle; Regulation; Market power. 
 3 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The term ‘capital buffers’ refers to any of a bank’s capital holdings that are in excess of the regulatory minimum. 
In this study, we measure capital buffers by finding the difference between observed regulatory capital-to-asset 
ratios and minimum regulatory ratios1. Positive capital buffers are persistent both across countries and over 
time, and they well exceed regulatory capital standards (Barth et al., 2006). According to the initial buffer 
calculations we use in this paper, average capital buffers are 9.20% for developed economies and 11.22% for 
developing economies (Table 1)2. This is notable as, according to corporate finance theory, issuing equity is 
costly, in part due to information asymmetries and agency problems faced by firms (Myers, 1984; Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). As long as the costs of obtaining capital remain sufficiently high with respect to the cost of 
deposits, we would expect leverage to increase consistently with regulation. However, banks on the whole 
maintain substantial regulatory capital buffer holdings.  
There are bank- and country-level factors that come to bear on a bank’s decision to have capital buffers. Some 
examples of bank-level variables include the bank’s business model, its relative size, and its profitability and 
risk levels. Country-level factors, meanwhile, include systemic levels of funding liquidity, banking regulations, 
the degree of competition within the banking industry, and the economy-wide business cycle. In this paper we 
control for these bank- and country-level variables when analyzing capital buffer determinants, and focus our 
analysis on the role played by market power and the business cycle.  
Market power may affect buffers through multiple channels. Large banks with market power may become more 
risk-averse when they see their charter value threatened by competition. Rates charged by banks with market 
power can cause adverse selection effects across borrowers, increasing risk and prompting banks to increase 
buffers. Credit rationing by large banks can determine risk levels in their pool of borrowers, implying different 
buffer profiles. Given this theoretical line of reasoning, we are interested in further exploring the role of market 
competition in stimulating buffer creation. There are documented global differences (across regions and income 
groups) in levels of financial development and bank competition (Čihák et al., 2012); an interesting but rarely 
touched-upon question concerns the extent to which regional differences in competition translate to differential 
patterns in capital buffers (after taking into account country-level heterogeneity in the business cycle). 
The business cycle may also affect buffers. When banks fail to accumulate capital buffers during economic 
booms, they can find themselves with insufficient levels of capital during economic downturns, meaning the 
cost of raising equity capital may force them to deleverage assets in order to meet regulatory minimum capital 
requirements (Repullo and Suarez, 2013; Borio and Zhu, 2012) 3.  
                                                          
1 See Table B, Appendix B for a detailed description of variables and sources. 
2 We also separate the also into four groups: OECD non-emerging, OHI (other high income, non-OECD), emerging, and other developing, 
following the classification in Claessens and Van Horen, 2015. Initial regression results indicate that the variables have a similar effect on 
the OECD (non-emerging) and OHI (non-OECD) groups, and the emerging and developing groups. "OECD" only includes the core OECD 
countries and "OHI" includes all countries classified as high-income by the World Bank in 2000 that do not are not OECD members. 
3 We refer to pro-cyclical behavior, throughout the paper, as behavior that tends to reinforce the current cyclical phase. We refer to pro-
cyclical co-movement or fluctuations as the correlation of a particular variable with the cycle. Thus, a negative (positive) coefficient of the 
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Before addressing these questions, though, it may make sense to sketch the recent history of macro-prudential 
regulation. After the date for implementation of the Second Accord was agreed by 2008, numerous countries 
were expected to gradually adapt Basel II. But the eruption of the global financial crisis postponed the adoption 
of the Second Accord in most of the world. Basel III calls for an overhaul of macro-prudential regulation, 
particularly for issues related to financial pro-cyclicality. Because of both the timing of the implementation and 
drastic regulatory changes after the crisis, the current state of banking regulation in developing markets can be 
characterized as non-convergent – countries have not fully implemented either Basel II or Basel III. Non-
convergent regulation is thus another possible source of country-level heterogeneity. 
To prevent the destabilizing cyclical impacts of capital buffer fluctuations, Basel III requires banks to increase 
capital buffers during economic booms, through a "mandatory capital conservation buffer" of 2.5%, as well as  
a "discretionary counter-cyclical buffer" of up to 2.5% more in times of credit booms. This counter-cyclical 
capital buffer tool is a central element of Basel III. However, since these proposals were calibrated mostly 
against BIS membership information, crucial questions remain unanswered: Are buffers pro-cyclical globally? 
What is the role of bank competition in explaining buffers? How do these factors interact across regions? 
Figure 1 shows average capital buffers in both developed and developing countries from 2001 to 2013. It also 
shows average real GDP growth rates for the two groups. During the period of economic expansion prior to the 
global financial crisis, average capital buffers in both regions seem to have followed the same pro-cyclical 
patterns. Capital buffers depleted progressively as the global economy expanded. However, after the crisis 
erupted, the buffer levels in the two regions started to diverge. In developed economies, the recovery was 
accompanied by increasing buffer levels, first because of rapid de-leveraging, and later because of increased 
regulatory pressure. Developing economies had a different experience. The post-crisis era was not accompanied 
by strong buffer accumulation. With economic deceleration beginning in 2010, these countries have seen both 
a rather rapid depletion of bank buffers and an increase in leverage. It seems that buffers became more counter-
cyclical after the crisis, but the implications of this shift are various. Given the divergent experiences of 
developed and developing nations, future regulatory policy approaches in both regions should be closely 
informed by the existence of differences between countries and cyclical patterns, as well as the evolution of 
leverage and competition levels. Other factors to take into account include idiosyncratic characteristics specific 
to  different banking systems.  
 
<Insert here Figure 1> 
 
At present there does not exist a wide literature on the cyclical patterns of buffers and effects of competition on 
a global scale. It is true that the heterogeneity of financial systems across the world has been well documented. 
                                                          
business cycle in the buffer regressions is an indicator of the counter-cyclical (pro-cyclical) fluctuation of the capital buffer over the business 
cycle. This implies pro-cyclical (counter-cyclical) behavior. 
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Significant differences persist in levels of financial development, and bank competition in particular, across 
regions and income groups (Čihák at al., 2012). In light of this heterogeneity, and the potential channels through 
which competition can affect bank capital decisions, a worthwhile research question might be asked regarding 
the extent to which these regional differences in competition translate into differential patterns in capital buffers. 
Country and regional evidence is mixed. In this paper, we use Boone indicators of market competition, 
searching for data on the effect of banking competition on buffer formation. We employ, for our baseline 
specifications, a database containing 10,632 bank-year observations from 54 developing and 25 developed 
countries during the period 2001 to 2013. Prompted by previous literature, we also explore regional differences 
in the cyclical patterns of buffers, taking into account both developed and developing economies.  
The empirical evidence presented in this paper is used to systematically explore the marginal effect of market 
power and the business cycle on buffer levels. Although we find that, taking the world as a whole, the average 
bank exhibits pro-cyclical behavior, implying that implementation of Basel III’s counter-cyclical buffer tools 
has been extensive and effective, we also find cross-national differences connected to each country’s respective 
levels of development and of bank competition.  
This paper contributes to the existing literature by examining an expanded range of banks and countries, 
including multiple dimensions, and incorporating various methodological improvements and robustness checks. 
There are, to the best of our knowledge, only two other previous studies that examine the determinants of global 
capital buffers: Fonseca and Gonzalez (2010) and Chen et al. (2014). Our empirical exercise is close in nature 
to that of Fonseca and Gonzalez (2010), as we include both bank- and country-level determinants in our 
analysis. In particular, our results indicate that competitive conditions in the banking system may play an acutely 
important role in the determination of capital buffer levels. This effect differs, however, for developed and 
developing economies. 
The paper is ordered as follows. In Section 2, we present a review of the related literature with regard to both 
theory and evidence. In Section 3, we present the econometric approach used across the empirical work in the 
field. The data and empirical results are presented in Section 4, after which we conclude with some policy-
related comments.  
2. Related Literature and Empirical Evidence 
A plethora of recent articles scrutinize the cyclical behavior, at both a national and a regional level, of bank 
capital buffers. However, the evidence in these studies is inconclusive as to whether buffers are pro-cyclical  
for either segments of the banking sector or the sector as a whole. For advanced economies, some studies find 
general evidence of pro-cyclical behavior (Ayuso et al., 2004; Lindquist, 2004; Stolz and Wedow, 2011; Bikker 
and Metzemakers, 2004; Jokipii and Milne, 2008; Shim, 2012; and Chen et al, 2014). Ayuso et al. (2004) find 
a significant, negative relationship between the business cycle and capital buffers for Spanish commercial and 
savings banks, after controlling for other bank-level buffer determinants such as size, risk profile and cost of 
capital. Similarly, Lindquist (2004) finds a negative relationship with the cycle for Norwegian commercial and 
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savings banks. This paper also detects a strong competition effect: the elasticity of a bank’s buffer capital with 
respect to an increase in competitors’ buffers is equal to one; higher competition is thus found to incentivize an 
increase in buffers. Stolz and Wedow (2011) examine German commercial and saving banks in the period 1993-
2003, also finding a negative correlation between buffers and the economic cycle. In addition, they observe that 
savings banks correlate more strongly with the cycle. Bikker and Metzemakers (2004) use a large worldwide 
dataset to search for global patterns in bank capital behavior. They find a significant, negative correlation 
between capital ratios and the cycle, but these effects are small in magnitude. 
Cyclical patterns are far from homogenous, however, even within advanced economies. Jokipii and Milne 
(2008) find evidence of pro-cyclical capital buffer behavior for commercial and savings banks and large banks 
in Europe. The capital buffers of cooperative and smaller banks are found to change in line with the cycle. They 
also find evidence of counter-cyclical behavior for banks located in recently admitted countries to the EU. In 
Australia, Vu and Turnell (2015) find evidence of pro-cyclical behavior for large banks, but counter-cyclical 
behavior for smaller banks. Turning to emerging markets, Carvallo et al. (2015) examine the determinants of 
capital buffer levels for the banking sectors in 13 Latin American and Caribbean countries from 2001 to 2012. 
They find a negative relationship between capital buffers and GDP growth for Argentina, Colombia, Ecuador, 
Peru and Uruguay, while buffers in Bolivia, Brazil, the Dominican Republic, Mexico, Panama and Venezuela 
are found to behave pro-cyclically. For Colombia, Garcia-Suaza et al. (2012) find a negative correlation 
between buffers and the economic cycle, with a stronger correlation for large banks. Tabak et al. (2011) also 
find a significant, negative relationship between the business cycle and capital buffers. Domestic private banks 
in Brazil are found to behave in a more pro-cyclical manner than their foreign and state-owned peers. Indian 
commercial banks, foreign ones in particular, are also found to behave pro-cyclically (Mahakud and Dash, 
2013). Similarly, while Kontbay-Busun and Kasman (2015) find that in general Turkish banks behave counter-
cyclically, Gursoy and Atici (2012) observe that commercial banks included in the Turkish deposit insurance 
fund scheme (Savings Deposit and Insurance Fund) behave counter-cyclically, whereas those not included 
behave pro-cyclically. In China, a recent study by Huang and Xiong (2015) shows that bank capital buffers 
have a counter-cyclical relationship with business cycle fluctuations. Zheng, Xu and Liang (2012) also find that 
the speed with which Chinese banks adjust to the target buffer level depends on the size of their capital buffers; 
banks with smaller buffers adjust more quickly. 
Among more comprehensive, cross-national studies, Saadaoui (2014) analyzes the relationship between capital 
buffers, the business cycle, and the default risk of 740 commercial banks in 50 emerging countries in the period 
1997 to 2008. Bank capital buffers and loan default risk are found to be negatively correlated with the business 
cycle, supporting the implementation of counter-cyclical buffers in these countries. Yet, notably, higher market 
power is found to be a critical mediating factor, as it attenuates this pro-cyclical behavior. Thus, for emerging 
economies, higher market power – as measured by bank Lerner indexes – is found to reduce the pro-cyclical 
behavior of banks. Returning to the only two papers that examine the global determinants of bank capital buffers 
for both advanced and developing regions: Fonseca and Gonzalez (2010) look at global determinants of capital 
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buffers for a sample of 1,337 banks from 70 countries, in the period 1995 to 2002. Their model uses a partial 
adjustment framework and pays special attention to the effect of market power and the role of regulation and 
institutional frameworks. With respect to bank-specific variables, the study includes factors such as the cost of 
funds, profitability and size. Buffers are not found to be systematically related to the business cycle, but they 
are found to be positively related to market power and the cost of deposits. However, these effects are sensitive 
to variations in regulation between countries, especially  accounting disclosure rules and the stringency of 
regulations on the scope of banking activities. We find the paper’s use of country-level controls and bank-
specific factors to be critically important, as it illustrates differentiated patterns in the levels of capital buffer 
holdings across and within developed and developing countries. One failing of the paper derives from the weak 
robustness of the results4.  More recently, Chen et al. (2014) examine the relations between total capital and 
common equity buffers with the business cycle, using a sample of banks from 171 countries, in the period 1995 
to 2009. They conclude that capital buffers are pro-cyclical at a global scale, regardless of organizational type 
or size. Their results also suggest that banks manipulate Tier 2 capital in order to signal stronger capital 
adequacy ratios. This seems to suggest that the stringency of accounting disclosure regulations may play an 
important role. Contrary to the two previous studies, however, only bank-specific variables are included in the 
regression analysis, which raises the question of how to compare banking ratios from unequal competitive and 
regulatory landscapes. The present study is in line with Fonseca and Gonzales (2010) and Saadaoui (2014), as 
it incorporates both bank and country variables, while trying to improve on some of the underlying technical 
issues, as explained in more detail below.    
The relationship between competition and bank risk attitudes demands complex and multifaceted analysis 
(Allen and Gale, 2004). The relationship between competition and financial stability is likewise a controversial 
question, and one which remains unresolved despite a large body of work having been produced on the issue. 
According to the so-called “competition-fragility” view, competition increases risk-taking, undermining the 
“charter value” of banks; it would follow that banks with market power have less incentive to engage in risky 
activities (Keeley, 1990). Another version of this view states that larger banks diversify better and are more 
efficient due to economies of scale that allow them to spread out their operations geographically (Boyd and 
Prescott, 1986; Méon and Weill, 2005). This lack of consensus has manifested itself in recent contributions to 
the literature. The “charter value hypothesis” has also been rationalized as large banks enjoy increased profit 
buffers (Allen and Gale, 2004; Matutes and Vives, 2000; Cordella and Yeyati, 2003). Larger banks engaging 
in “credit rationing” enhance soundness as they pick fewer but higher quality investments (Boot and Thakor, 
2000). 
Under the “competition-stability” view, the “too big to fail” doctrine posits that implicit public guarantees led 
to increased risk-taking by the largest banks (Mishkin, 1999). Boyd and De Nicoló (2005) argue that rates 
                                                          
4 This may reflect econometrics issues. First, the Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM difference estimator is used. Estimation by alternative 
techniques, such as the Arellano and Bover (1995) GMM two step estimator, could yield different results. Secondly, standard errors are not 
corrected for finite sample bias, which undermines significance results (Windmeijer, 2005). All these improvements have proved useful in 
more recent work. Finally, the global studies reviewed include a size variable related to the global market and not to the national jurisdiction, 
which would have seemed more appropriate. 
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charged by banks with market power induce increased risk-taking by entrepreneurs. Increased scope and scale 
economies can be counterbalanced by increased managerial inefficiency (“X-inefficiency”) due to increased 
complexity (Beck et al., 2006). While some empirical work supports the “competition-fragility” view (Beck et 
al., 2006), other studies provide evidence supporting a “competition-stability” hypothesis (De Nicoló et al., 
2004; Schaeck et al., 2006; Uhde and Heimeshoff, 2009).   
This debate bears on the relationship between banking competition and capital ratios. Schaeck and Cihák (2012) 
use data from ten European countries to test the hypothesis that competition creates incentives for greater capital 
retention. Their paper arose partly out of Allen et al. (2011), who analyze the credit side of banks, and 
characterize capital holdings as a means of signaling commitment to monitoring in the presence of market 
discipline. According to their model, when banks compete for good lending opportunities, borrowers may 
demand that banks use their own capital for loans, thus incentivizing proper monitoring. As some borrowers do 
not fully internalize the cost to banks of raising capital, the resulting capital level could be above the regulatory 
requirement. Indeed, Schaeck and Cihák (2012) find that market competition increases bank capital holdings. 
Moreover, market power may be associated with lower capital holdings if large banks enjoy lower adjustment 
and capital costs, and larger margins and profitability, with increasing bank revenues reducing the role of capital 
as a buffer to absorb future losses (Elizalde and Repullo, 2007)5. As noted above, Lindquist (2004) also finds 
that in Norway bank competition increases buffer holdings. This suggests that banks probably use excess capital 
to signal solvency and stability. It may also be the case that banks with market power are more vulnerable to 
systemic risk during large downturns, as the experience of the recent global financial crisis has shown (Demsetz 
and Strahan, 1997). 
To summarize, our assessment of the status of knowledge regarding the determinants of capital buffers lead us 
to assume that regional and country effects are at play with regard to both the cycle and market competition. 
This calls for an empirical approach able to systemically capture this complex interplay. With this in mind, we 
use a partial adjustment framework to explore: 
1. The cyclical patterns of capital buffers, both globally and in developed and developing economies.  
2. The influence of levels of competition in national markets in determining the level of capital buffers. 
We presume that, given well-documented differences across regions in both dimensions, observed capital 
buffers should also reflect differential patterns. 
 
3. A Partial Adjustment Framework 
 
                                                          
5 Elizalde and Repullo (2007) also claim that, on the one hand, larger margins and profitability increase the bank’s franchise value and 
therefore reduce shareholders’ incentives to contribute capital. They find a net positive effect of margins and profitability on economic 
capital. 
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Given the evidence that capital buffer levels are persistent (see Figure 2), we use a partial adjustment framework 
to model banks’ decisions regarding the optimum target for capital buffers. In line with previous literature 
(Ayuso et. al., 2004; Jokipii and Milne, 2008; Shim, 2012; Carvallo et al., 2015), the partial adjustment model 
can be represented as: 
 
Δ𝐵𝑈𝐹𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼(𝐵𝑈𝐹𝑖,𝑡
∗ − 𝐵𝑈𝐹𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝜂𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡                                       (1) 
     
where 𝐵𝑈𝐹𝑖,𝑡 and 𝐵𝑈𝐹𝑖,𝑡
∗  denote the actual and target capital buffer of bank 𝑖 at time 𝑡, respectively. Coefficient 
𝛼 measures the speed of adjustment of the actual capital buffer towards its target level. Factors 𝜂𝑖 are bank-
specific and permanently affect banks’ capital structure decisions. 𝑢𝑖,𝑡 is independently distributed with zero 
mean.  
 
<Insert here Figure 2> 
 
Adding the lag of 𝐵𝑈𝐹𝑖,𝑡 to both sides of Eq. (6), we obtain: 
 
𝐵𝑈𝐹𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝐵𝑈𝐹𝑖,𝑡
∗ + (1 − 𝛼)𝐵𝑈𝐹𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜂𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡                                       (2) 
 
The optimum level of capital buffer (𝐵𝑈𝐹𝑖,𝑡
∗ ) is not observable. It is approximated by the business cycle and 
bank-specific characteristics, as in the related literature (Jokipii and Milne, 2008; Stolz and Wedow, 2005; 
Shim, 2012; Garcia-Suaza et al., 2012). In addition, in the empirical analysis we also control for the level of 
competition, the regulatory environment, and the country’s financial depth as potential determinants of the 
optimal capital buffer level. Hence the empirical model is specified as follows: 
 
𝐵𝑈𝐹𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐵𝑈𝐹𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛿
𝑖𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜂𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡                                       (3) 
 
Where 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 is a vector with variables that we assume influence bank 𝑖’s optimal buffer at time 𝑡, with 𝛼1 = 1 −
𝛼 reflecting the costs of adjustment. The idea behind this specification is to evaluate the effect of such variables 
on the accumulation of capital buffers (Jokipii and Milne, 2008; Stolz and Wedow, 2011; Shim, 2012; Garcia-
Suaza et. al., 2012; Carvallo et. al.,  2015; Fonseca and Gonzales, 2010). While much of this literature has 
focused on the impact of the business cycle on buffers, we also look at other determinants, both through 
independent channels or through their interaction with the business cycle.  
 
The introduction of a lagged dependent variable among the right-hand-side variables in Eq. (3) creates an 
endogeneity problem, since the lagged dependent variable might be correlated with the disturbance term. To 
solve this problem, Arellano and Bond (1991) developed a difference GMM estimator for the coefficients in 
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the above-mentioned equation, where the lagged levels of the regressors are the instruments for the equation in 
first differences. However, Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) suggest differencing the 
instruments instead of the regressors in order to make them exogenous to the fixed effects. This leads to a shift 
from the difference GMM to the system GMM estimator, which is a joint estimation of the equation in levels 
and in first differences. We therefore use two-step system GMM estimators, with the Windmeijer (2005) 
corrected standard error.  
 
4. Data and Empirical Results 
 
4.1 Data 
 
This study combines data from an unbalanced annual bank panel with a set of country regulatory and 
macroeconomic variables for 3,461 banks from 79 countries for the period 2001-2013. First, we use Bankscope6 
data for all bank-specific variables. Second, we consider a set of macroeconomic and regulatory variables 
publicly available on the World Bank database as the “The Regulation of Banks around the World”: surveys I, 
II, III and IV. After merging these data sets, the initial sample of banks in which we are able to calculate the 
dependent variable (i.e., capital buffer) is 7,0907. However, after estimating our baseline specifications (Table 
2, below), we obtain subsamples ranging from 10,632 (3,461 banks) to 6,538 observations (2,193 banks), 
depending on specifications. Nonetheless, the resulting sample represents a wide set of countries and a relevant 
amount of observations and banks from developed and developing countries (see Table C/Appendix C for 
representativeness of the sample). Accordingly, the average number of countries represented in those baseline 
specifications is 54 developing and 25 developed. The average time length for both groups of countries is 
similar: around 3 years. Given the unbalanced nature of the panel, including gaps, we use a forward orthogonal 
deviations transformation in estimation, an alternative to differencing proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995). 
This method helps preserve the sample size in panels with gaps. A detailed description of the variables 
considered in the regressions is displayed in Table B, Appendix B8. 
 
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics that aggregate countries into a developed and a developing group. 
Following Claessens and Van Horen (2013, 2015), we classified “developed” countries as OECD-non-emerging 
plus Other High Income (OHI) (labeled as OECD), while the rest of the countries are classified as “developing” 
(labeled as DEV + EME). Using this income aggregation, our sample shows buffers, profitability and risk to be 
larger in developing economies, whereas developed economies present greater financial depth. The countries 
                                                          
6 BankScope is a database for bank-sheet level data based on financial statement information provided by Bureau van Dijk. BankScope has 
been extensively used in the banking literature and provides harmonized data that permit cross-country comparisons. 
7 However, in the specific case of the variable SizeCo – a dummy that takes 1 if the bank size belongs to the top quartile in their national 
size distribution – we use all the information of the initial annual unbalanced bank panel (24,087 banks). We were able to calculate buffers 
for 7,090 banks from 143 countries during the period between 2001 and 2013 (40,096 observations).  
8 Regulatory variables are available from: 
http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/0,,contentMDK:20345037~pagePK:64214825~piPK:642
14943~theSitePK:469382,00.html  
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included in our baseline specifications that are classified as developed are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, 
Cyprus, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong SAR (China), Iceland, Israel, Italy, Kuwait, Luxembourg, 
Macao SAR (China), Malta, Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, Qatar, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland, United 
Kingdom, and United States; the countries classified as developing are: Argentina, Armenia, Bangladesh, 
Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, Colombia, Croatia, Dominican Republic, 
El Salvador, Ghana, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Kenya, South Korea, 
Latvia, Lebanon, Lithuania, Macedonia (FYR), Malawi, Malaysia, Mauritius, Moldova, Mozambique, 
Namibia, Nicaragua, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Sierra Leone, 
Slovak Republic, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Uganda, 
Uruguay, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe. 
 
<Insert here Table 1> 
 
 
4.2 Empirical results 
 
Tables 2 to 6 show our Blundell-Bond two step GMM estimated for capital buffers, for the years 2001-2013. 
Because of the large number of US banks in our sample (15% of the total), and given the complexity of this 
market, we ran our regressions first using all the banks in the sample, and then excluding US banks (last five 
columns in Tables 2-6). In Table 2, we show the results of our baseline specification for the overall global 
sample and the sample excluding banks operating in the US. We check the robustness of our main results by 
incorporating different sets of country variables, namely: regulatory indicators plus the financial depth variable 
(M2 as a percentage of GDP - MCM); the block of equations incorporating the average return of assets (ROAA); 
and the cost of funds variable (interest income paid/total funding - CF).  
In Table 2, the coefficient on the lagged buffer (L.BUF) is highly significant in all specifications, revealing the 
presence of significant adjustment costs for banks to change their capital buffers to their target amounts. 
Coefficients are in the range of 0.47-0.50, which are slightly below the coefficients of 0.65-0.67 obtained by 
Saadaoui (2014) for a sample of 50 developing economies. The coefficients are also larger than the 0.22-0.31 
range estimated in Fonseca and Gonzalez (2010), but much lower than the 0.906 coefficient estimated in Chen 
et al. (2014), both for global samples. Another result that is quite robust through all the regressions exercises is 
the one concerning the variable “SizeCo”, which measures the bank’s relative size. It is a dummy variable that 
takes the value 1 if the natural logarithm of the bank’s total assets belongs to the top quartile nationally. The 
coefficient on this variable is significantly negative across all specifications, indicating that the average global 
bank has lower capital buffers if it belongs to the top national quartile in size. This result is persistent in all the 
studies registered in the literature, regardless of whether their analysis is performed at the country, regional or 
global level. Furthermore, this result is also consistent with several of the theoretical hypotheses advanced in 
the literature, in particular those related to implicit public guarantees (the “too big to fail” view), as well as 
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those similar to the hypothesis of Elizalde and Repullo (2007), which states that larger banks with larger 
margins, lower adjustment costs, and higher profitability could exhibit lower capital holdings.  
A key variable in our analysis is the Boone indicator (Boone 2001, 2008), which is calculated as the elasticity 
of profits to marginal costs. Its rationale is that higher profits can be achieved by more efficient banks. Appendix 
A has more details about this indicator. The more negative the Boone indicator, the higher the degree of 
competition, because the effect of reallocation is stronger. Throughout all of our results this market power 
indicator is significant and positive, indicating that in banking markets where more competitive conditions 
prevail, banks tend to have lower capital buffers (Table 2). This result is reminiscent of theories based on the 
“charter value” of banks and the detrimental effect of competition with regard to bank risk attitudes (Keeley, 
1990).  
 
<Insert here Table 2> 
 
However, as Table 3 shows, these general results are sensitive to the bank’s location in either developed or 
developing regions, with a sign reversal in the former. More competition is now associated with higher capital 
buffers in developed countries and lower buffers in developing ones. The evidence suggests that the 
“competition-stability” view is correct in developed economies, whereas the “competition-fragility” view is 
correct in  developing countries. Our result for developed countries is consistent with the empirical evidence 
for Europe (Schaeck and Cihák, 2012) and the US (Saunders and Wilson, 2001), which finds that banks facing 
fiercer competition have higher capital buffers. It is also consistent with theoretical models such as Boyd and 
De Nicoló (2005), where more competition is associated with increasing risk-taking, and the model in Allen et 
al. (2011), which illustrates that, in highly competitive markets, banks can find it optimal to use costly capital 
to signal commitment to monitoring. A commitment to monitoring attracts good borrowers and leads to a higher 
surplus. Crucially, this disciplining mechanism depends on market transparency, which is consistent with our 
evidence regarding bank accounting transparency. The evidence for developing countries is more consistent 
with the “charter value” hypothesis and its recent rationalizations on the market power side (Keeley, 1990; 
Boyd and Prescott, 1986; Méon and Weill, 2005; Allen and Gale, 2004; Matutes and Vives, 2000; Cordella and 
Yeyati, 2003). Large banks in these countries can enjoy increased profit buffers or more easily engage in “credit 
rationing”, thus enhancing stability as they choose fewer but higher quality investments (Boot and Thakor, 
2000). 
 
<Insert here Table 3> 
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The average global bank capital buffer is negatively correlated with the growth of economic activity (GGDP) 
– in other words, it behaves pro-cyclically. This strongly supports Basel’s III proposed counter-cyclical buffer 
tools and is also consistent with findings from several country-level and other more general studies (Ayuso et 
al., 2004; Lindquist, 2004; Bikker and Metzemakers, 2004; Jokipii and Milne, 2008; Shim, 2012; and Chen et 
al., 2014)9. The results for the sample excluding the US are generally the same as those from the global sample 
(Table 2). 
To uncover cross-national differences in the effect of these factors on buffer levels, we first analyzed the 
variation in income or economic development across countries. We thus grouped countries according to income 
and classified them as either “developed” or “developing”. We introduced a dummy equal to one for the 
developing country region and interacted it with the business cycle variable, the growth rate of real GDP. The 
average coefficient for developing countries is significantly negative, which indicates that on average the buffer 
levels for developing banks are pro-cyclical (Table 4). Notably, the average effect for banks in developed 
countries is counter-cyclical (positive sign), although mostly insignificant. These results indicate that pro-
cyclicality is generally more of a problem in developing countries. This is particularly worrying as capital 
buffers have been rapidly decreasing in developing countries during the recent economic slowdown (Figure 1). 
 
<Insert here Table 4> 
 
For robustness, we replicate the specifications in Table 3, but use alternative measures of market power. First 
we use country averages of banks’ Lerner indexes (Table 5). Next we use the asset market share of the five 
largest banks, a measure of market concentration (Table 6)10. The effect of the average Lerner indexes on buffers 
is found to be statistically insignificant for seven out of the ten specifications. Moreover, the concentration 
measure is found to be statistically significant only for the regressions that exclude US banks, presenting  a 
positive sign. 
One of the factors that complicate this picture is the complexity inherent in the relationship between bank 
concentration and effective competition. On both a theoretical and empirical basis, it has become clear in recent 
years that concentration and effective competition measure different dimensions of the competitive landscape. 
A range of papers has concluded that using concentration as a measure of competition can be misleading (see 
e.g., Carbo-Valverde et al, 2009). Numerous studies have shown that concentration and competition may be 
uncorrelated or even positively correlated (Claessens and Laeven, 2004)11. In light of these developments, more 
                                                          
9 A surprising result in our regressions is the sign of Official Supervisory Power (OSP). It is meant to capture “whether the supervisory 
authorities have the authority to take specific actions to prevent and correct problems”. This variable generally has a negative sign, which 
seems counterintuitive, although its significance is not robust across specifications. It could indicate some form of substitution between 
private and public risk-control mechanisms. Fonseca and Gonzales (2010) get a similar result via its interaction with the cost of capital. 
10 To the extent that Bankscope does not have 100% coverage of banking systems, and is limited to commercial banks, all these measures 
share potential selection biases equally. 
11 Bikker and Haaf (2002) study the interrelation between market structure and competitiveness, using cross-country data. They provide 
support for the conventional view that concentration reduces competitiveness. Claessens and Laeven (2004), however, find that competition 
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recent studies have focused on non-structural measures of competition, i.e., measures that do not rely on the 
link between structure and conduct to infer market power. Both the Boone and Lerner indicators fall within this 
category. However, one of the theoretical weaknesses of the country-wide Lerner indices is that they are 
averages of the market power of individual banks. Even if individual Lerner indices decrease with competition, 
the average degree of market power may increase, decrease or remain stable due to relocation effects from 
inefficient firms to efficient firms (Boone, 2008). Thus, within the context of this global study, we consider our 
Boone indicators to be superior measures of the effective level of competition in banking systems.  
 
<Insert here Table 5> 
<Insert here Table 6> 
 
It might also be argued that, because of our particular sample’s time window, which includes the global financial 
crisis, our results may capture reverse causality from the banking system to the economic cycle. We examine 
this possibility in two ways, and make use of Laeven and Valencia’s (2013) global database on the occurrence 
of crises and, in particular, systemic banking crises. First, we ran our set of regressions for the pre-global 
financial crisis period (2001-2006), and considered this period to be “tranquil times”. Then we ran our 
regressions only for countries that did not experience systemic crises during the 2007-2009 period, and called 
these “tranquil countries” (tranquil, that is, with respect to the global financial crisis). For both cases, we found 
that our results regarding the cycle held. We also looked at the cyclical behavior of different components of 
capital buffers, by running the previous set of regressions on three key buffer components: (1) the actual 
regulatory capital ratio itself; (2) the tier 1 capital ratio; and (3) the ratio of loan-to-total assets, which is a key 
determinant of risk-weighted assets. We found global banks behave pro-cyclically with respect to the regulatory 
capital ratio. They do so by increasing (decreasing) tier 1 capital ratios during periods of decreased (increased) 
economic activity and by reducing (increasing) lending ratios during periods of decreased (increased) economic 
activity. However, for most specifications, the magnitude of the adjustment effect seems to be larger for the 
loan ratio than for the tier 1 adjustment effect12.  
 
5. Conclusions 
 
 In this paper, we look for the determinants of bank capital buffers at a global scale, using a large dataset of 
3,461 banks from 79 countries for the 2001-2013 period. The world average bank exhibits pro-cyclical behavior. 
This would seem to underline a global need for extensive and effective implementation of Basel III’s proposed 
counter-cyclical buffer tools. The average coefficient for developing countries is, however, consistently larger 
                                                          
is not negatively related to market concentration. 
12 Results available upon request. 
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than the average effect worldwide (Table 6). Of note is the fact that the average effect for banks in developed 
countries is mostly insignificant, with a positive sign. This result indicates that pro-cyclicality seems to be a 
more generalized problem in developing countries. 
Another important result relates to competition. Throughout all of our results, the Boone indicator is 
significantly and positively associated with buffers, indicating that in banking markets where more competitive 
conditions prevail, banks tend to have lower capital buffers. This result is reminiscent of theories based on the 
“charter value” of banks and the detrimental effect of competition on bank risk attitudes (Keeley, 1990; Boyd 
and Prescott, 1986; Méon and Weill, 2005; Allen and Gale, 2004; Matutes and Vives, 2000; Cordella and 
Yeyati, 2003). This general result is, however, sensitive to whether banks are located in developed or developing 
regions, with a sign reversal in the former. More competition is thus associated with higher capital buffers in 
developed countries, and lower buffers in developing ones. This evidence supports the “competition-stability” 
view for developed economies and the “competition-fragility” view for developing countries.  
This asymmetric result may have important policy implications, particularly with regard to the new globally-
negotiated capital adequacy standards. The initial conditions for regulatory revamping differ across regions. 
Since the global financial crisis there has been substantial deleveraging and capitalization levels have 
strengthened. However, higher pro-cyclicality in developing countries implies that capitalization levels are 
actually more compromised than previously thought. Transaction costs and market power are known to be 
greater in the financial systems of developing economies. Furthermore, in these countries, given the absence of 
correctly-functioning liquid capital markets and market discipline, market power remains critical for sustaining 
higher capital buffer levels. These differences should be considered while deploying regional efforts to revamp 
the regulatory landscape by creating more systemic and cycle-sensitive capital regulation. As an increasing 
number of countries prepare for full implementation of Basel III, the optimal sequencing and mix of instruments 
and priorities should therefore consider simultaneously the competitive and prudential aspects of particular 
countries. Competition-enhancing regulation in developing countries should go hand in hand with market 
reform aimed at reducing transaction costs and information asymmetries. This would improve financial market 
depth, liquidity and discipline. A comprehensive approach must also consider the stringency of capital 
regulations, along with policies aimed at improving competition and capital market reform. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1: Sample descriptive statistics by sub-regions (Country averages 2001-2013) 
  Total OECD+OHI (1) DEV+EME (2) Diff. in means 
  Mean Sd. Countries Mean Sd. Countries Mean Sd. Countries  (1) - (2) 
BUF 10.58 5.60 79 9.20 3.97 25 11.22 6.13 54 -1.50 
Size 14.22 1.49 79 15.34 1.04 25 13.71 1.38 54 5.28*** 
ROAA 1.09 1.08 79 0.67 0.65 25 1.29 1.18 54 -2.42** 
ROAE 11.22 7.22 79 8.41 5.04 25 12.52 7.73 54 -2.42** 
CF 4.23 2.87 79 3.86 2.67 25 4.41 2.96 54 -0.78 
LLRGL 4.30 2.42 79 3.16 1.93 25 4.82 2.46 54 -2.96*** 
BOONE -0.07 0.19 79 -0.034 0.16 25 -0.088 0.20 54 1.21 
Lerner 0.26 0.09 75 0.232 0.12 25 0.278 0.09 50 -2.23** 
5-conc 77.67 14.99 77 82.83 15.55 24 75.33 14.26 53 2.07** 
OCS 4.74 1.46 79 4.66 1.43 25 4.77 1.48 54 -0.31 
OSP 11.29 1.72 79 10.72 1.64 25 11.56 1.71 54 -2.07** 
BACC 3.65 0.39 79 3.69 0.37 25 3.64 0.40 54 0.60 
MCM 87.56 79.01 79 156.08 102.8 25 55.83 34.07 54 6.48*** 
Two sample mean comparison t-test for unequal variances* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Sd 
denotes the standard deviation. We also separate the data into four groups: OECD non-emerging, OHI 
(other high income, non-OECD), emerging, and other developing, following a recent classification in 
Claessens and Van Horen, (2015). Initial regression results indicate that the effects of variables are 
similar in OECD (non-emerging) and OHI (non-OECD), and in emerging and developing. "OECD" 
only includes the core OECD countries and "OHI" includes all those countries classified as high-
income by the World Bank in 2000 but that do not belong to OECD. SizeCo is a dummy variable that 
takes 1 if bank's size belongs to the top quartile in its national size distribution; ROAA is the return on 
assets; ROAE is the return on equity; LLRGL is the ratio of non-performing loans to total bank assets; 
BOONE is the competition index; Lerner is an index of market power; 5-conc represents the assets of 
the country’s five largest banks as a share of total commercial banks; CF is the cost of funding; OCS 
is an index that measures  overall capital stringency; OSP is an index that measures regulatory 
authority power; and BACC is a dummy for bank accounting. Notice these statistics are different from 
those in Table 1, since they are un-weighted averages of country variable averages.  
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Table 2. Estimation Results: Blundell-Bond Two-Step System GMM Estimates for Capital Buffer, 2001-2013 
 A. Whole sample B. Excluding US banks 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
BUF (-1) 0.564*** 0.564*** 0.505*** 0.497*** 0.497*** 0.565*** 0.563*** 0.478*** 0.472*** 0.472*** 
 (0.0891) (0.0893) (0.0927) (0.0952) (0.0950) (0.0910) (0.0912) (0.0986) (0.0990) (0.0988) 
SizeCo -0.956*** -0.937*** -1.058*** -1.075*** -1.064** -1.191*** -1.181*** -1.628*** -1.546*** -1.434*** 
 (0.331) (0.329) (0.389) (0.398) (0.413) (0.367) (0.367) (0.455) (0.439) (0.436) 
GGDP -0.119*** -0.0996*** -0.0973*** -0.103*** -0.0886*** -0.0934*** -0.0648** -0.0846*** -0.0689** -0.0588* 
 (0.0229) (0.0246) (0.0287) (0.0286) (0.0293) (0.0271) (0.0295) (0.0311) (0.0325) (0.0327) 
ROAA 0.520*** 0.533*** 0.563*** 0.558*** 0.568*** 0.531*** 0.551*** 0.537*** 0.541*** 0.543*** 
 (0.102) (0.106) (0.118) (0.120) (0.122) (0.127) (0.131) (0.134) (0.138) (0.138) 
LLRGL 0.195*** 0.203*** 0.160*** 0.172*** 0.185*** 0.210*** 0.224*** 0.190*** 0.203*** 0.211*** 
 (0.0464) (0.0480) (0.0467) (0.0480) (0.0493) (0.0520) (0.0543) (0.0528) (0.0546) (0.0560) 
BOONE 2.362*** 2.380*** 2.833*** 2.942*** 2.871*** 2.194*** 2.199*** 2.927*** 2.785*** 2.790*** 
 (0.749) (0.766) (0.745) (0.945) (0.959) (0.738) (0.755) (0.753) (0.962) (0.969) 
OCS 0.246*** 0.261*** 0.280*** 0.247*** 0.243*** 0.0952** 0.104** 0.0742 0.0321 0.0408 
 (0.0471) (0.0475) (0.0590) (0.0609) (0.0604) (0.0478) (0.0475) (0.0613) (0.0641) (0.0642) 
OSP -0.0581* -0.0267 -0.00939 0.0130 -0.0174 -0.0795** -0.0439 -0.0879* -0.0490 -0.0653 
 (0.0299) (0.0322) (0.0407) (0.0457) (0.0469) (0.0400) (0.0401) (0.0507) (0.0520) (0.0538) 
BACC 0.336** 0.449***  0.371** 0.403** -0.192 -0.0663  -0.267 -0.178 
 (0.149) (0.148)  (0.184) (0.198) (0.169) (0.161)  (0.235) (0.239) 
MCM  0.00400***     0.00544***    
  (0.00154)     (0.00166)    
CF   -0.0247 -0.0287* -0.0231   -0.0222 -0.0148 -0.0120 
   (0.0161) (0.0165) (0.0169)   (0.0184) (0.0215) (0.0218) 
Cooperative     0.417     0.428 
     (0.262)     (0.288) 
Savings     1.159***     -0.449 
     (0.394)     (0.528) 
Cons 1.768** 0.330 2.833** 1.439 1.411 4.426*** 2.721* 4.959*** 5.416*** 5.054*** 
 (0.813) (1.012) (1.126) (1.195) (1.267) (1.343) (1.419) (1.443) (1.767) (1.788) 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 10632 10556 6880 6538 6538 7275 7199 5316 4974 4974 
Panels 3461 3440 2316 2193 2193 2930 2909 1885 1762 1762 
j 84 85 84 85 87 84 85 84 85 87 
Hansen 80.34 80.20 70.47 69.33 68.67 69.24 68.29 63.05 61.88 61.30 
Hansen-p 0.0816 0.0831 0.270 0.302 0.322 0.305 0.334 0.510 0.552 0.572 
AR1 -4.698 -4.687 -3.764 -3.676 -3.680 -4.367 -4.346 -3.687 -3.632 -3.634 
AR1-p 0.00000263 0.00000277 0.000168 0.000237 0.000233 0.0000126 0.0000139 0.000227 0.000281 0.000279 
AR2 1.675 1.683 0.941 0.940 0.924 1.514 1.518 0.706 0.683 0.674 
AR2p 0.0939 0.0924 0.347 0.347 0.355 0.130 0.129 0.480 0.495 0.500 
Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The Hansen is a test of the over-identifying restrictions for the GMM estimator. AR1 and AR2 are tests for the first-order and second-
order serial correlation. N denotes number of observations, Ng number of banks and J number of instruments. Year denotes if year dummy variables were introduced in the regressions. BUF(-1) is the lag 
of bank's capital buffer; SizeCo is a dummy variable that takes 1 if bank's size belongs to the top quartile; ROAA is the return on assets; ROAE is the return on equity; LLRGL is the ratio of non-performing 
loans to total bank assets; BOONE is the competition index; CF is the cost of funding; OCS is an index that measures overall capital stringency; OSP is an index that measures regulatory authority power; 
BACC is a dummy for bank accounting; MCM is the ratio of money and quasi-money to GDP; and Cooperative and Savings are dummy variables that identify the type of bank. 
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Table 3. Estimation Results: Blundell-Bond Two-Step System GMM Estimates for Capital Buffer, 2001-2013: Buffers and Competition 
 A. Whole sample B. Excluding US banks 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
BUF(-1) 0.564*** 0.566*** 0.507*** 0.499*** 0.499*** 0.566*** 0.566*** 0.481*** 0.476*** 0.475*** 
 (0.0892) (0.0894) (0.0921) (0.0945) (0.0942) (0.0913) (0.0915) (0.0985) (0.0988) (0.0987) 
SizeCo -1.033*** -1.015*** -1.185*** -1.180*** -1.164*** -1.163*** -1.158*** -1.616*** -1.534*** -1.429*** 
 (0.337) (0.334) (0.397) (0.408) (0.423) (0.369) (0.370) (0.453) (0.436) (0.433) 
GGDP -0.100*** -0.0825*** -0.0869*** -0.0920*** -0.0793*** -0.0886*** -0.0620** -0.0800** -0.0670** -0.0582* 
 (0.0236) (0.0253) (0.0289) (0.0289) (0.0295) (0.0273) (0.0297) (0.0311) (0.0324) (0.0325) 
ROAA 0.538*** 0.549*** 0.584*** 0.581*** 0.589*** 0.538*** 0.557*** 0.547*** 0.550*** 0.551*** 
 (0.104) (0.107) (0.120) (0.123) (0.124) (0.128) (0.132) (0.135) (0.139) (0.139) 
LLRGL 0.209*** 0.215*** 0.168*** 0.178*** 0.190*** 0.211*** 0.223*** 0.188*** 0.200*** 0.209*** 
 (0.0481) (0.0492) (0.0472) (0.0484) (0.0496) (0.0525) (0.0545) (0.0531) (0.0549) (0.0563) 
OCS 0.258*** 0.257*** 0.294*** 0.272*** 0.267*** 0.130*** 0.125** 0.114* 0.0716 0.0784 
 (0.0474) (0.0469) (0.0595) (0.0619) (0.0610) (0.0488) (0.0487) (0.0600) (0.0631) (0.0632) 
OSP -0.0625** -0.0397 -0.0204 -0.00138 -0.0282 -0.0635 -0.0367 -0.0776 -0.0435 -0.0585 
 (0.0296) (0.0316) (0.0408) (0.0457) (0.0468) (0.0400) (0.0404) (0.0501) (0.0516) (0.0533) 
BACC 0.267* 0.400***  0.224 0.263 -0.154 -0.0223  -0.272 -0.191 
 (0.147) (0.145)  (0.180) (0.195) (0.169) (0.162)  (0.236) (0.240) 
MCM  0.00383**     0.00517***    
  (0.00152)     (0.00166)    
CF   -0.0146 -0.0169 -0.0126   -0.0173 -0.0103 -0.00800 
   (0.0169) (0.0174) (0.0178)   (0.0186) (0.0217) (0.0220) 
Cooperative     0.380     0.388 
     (0.263)     (0.289) 
Savings     1.072***     -0.450 
     (0.391)     (0.523) 
BOONE -6.304*** -6.661*** -7.700*** -7.087*** -6.622*** -3.851** -3.470** -3.575 -2.837 -2.646 
 (1.748) (1.690) (2.278) (2.292) (2.267) (1.766) (1.708) (2.245) (2.299) (2.301) 
BOONE*Developing 9.323*** 9.577*** 11.14*** 10.63*** 10.06*** 6.493*** 5.985*** 6.842*** 5.955** 5.758** 
 (1.986) (1.928) (2.398) (2.578) (2.551) (1.839) (1.749) (2.318) (2.412) (2.411) 
Cons 1.809** 0.519 2.588** 1.828 1.770 3.831*** 2.338 4.409*** 5.103*** 4.775*** 
 (0.811) (1.010) (1.090) (1.217) (1.287) (1.361) (1.447) (1.420) (1.752) (1.771) 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 10632 10556 6880 6538 6538 7275 7199 5316 4974 4974 
Panels 3461 3440 2316 2193 2193 2930 2909 1885 1762 1762 
j 85 86 85 86 88 85 86 85 86 88 
Hansen 79.06 79.48 70.08 68.92 68.00 70.07 69.52 63.97 62.70 62.06 
Hansen-p 0.0973 0.0919 0.281 0.315 0.343 0.281 0.297 0.478 0.523 0.545 
AR1 -4.687 -4.686 -3.779 -3.697 -3.701 -4.369 -4.354 -3.696 -3.646 -3.649 
AR1-p 0.00000277 0.00000278 0.000157 0.000218 0.000215 0.0000125 0.0000133 0.000219 0.000266 0.000264 
AR2 1.693 1.694 0.957 0.958 0.942 1.520 1.520 0.726 0.702 0.693 
AR2p 0.0905 0.0903 0.339 0.338 0.346 0.129 0.129 0.468 0.483 0.488 
Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The Hansen is a test of the over-identifying restrictions for the GMM estimator. AR1 and AR2 are tests for the first-order and second-order serial correlation. N 
denotes number of observations, Ng number of banks and J number of instruments. Year denotes if year dummy variables were introduced in the regressions. BUF(-1) is the lag of bank's capital buffer; SizeCo is a dummy variable 
that takes 1 if bank's size belongs to the top quartile in its national size distribution; ROAA is the return on assets; ROAE is the return on equity; LLRGL is the ratio of non-performing loans to total bank assets; BOONE is the 
competition index; CF is the cost of funding; OCS is an index that measures overall capital stringency; OSP is an index that measures regulatory authority power; BACC is a dummy for bank accounting; MCM is the ratio of money 
and quasi-money to GDP; and Cooperative and Savings are dummy variables that identify the type of bank. 
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Table 4. Estimation Results: Blundell-Bond Two-Step System GMM Estimates for Capital Buffer, 2001-2013: Cyclicality in Developed and 
Developing Economies 
 A. Whole sample B. Excluding US banks 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
BUF(-1) 0.558*** 0.559*** 0.503*** 0.495*** 0.495*** 0.562*** 0.562*** 0.479*** 0.473*** 0.473*** 
 (0.0894) (0.0897) (0.0935) (0.0960) (0.0956) (0.0900) (0.0904) (0.0981) (0.0987) (0.0986) 
SizeCo -1.065*** -1.040*** -1.167*** -1.166*** -1.155*** -1.198*** -1.187*** -1.652*** -1.573*** -1.463*** 
 (0.337) (0.337) (0.396) (0.406) (0.420) (0.366) (0.366) (0.455) (0.441) (0.436) 
GGDP*Developing -0.204*** -0.186*** -0.180*** -0.166*** -0.160*** -0.199*** -0.166*** -0.122*** -0.107*** -0.105*** 
 (0.0354) (0.0340) (0.0375) (0.0390) (0.0382) (0.0372) (0.0339) (0.0362) (0.0382) (0.0381) 
GGDP 0.0578 0.0554 0.0512 0.0378 0.0480 0.0766* 0.0705* 0.0189 0.0240 0.0319 
 (0.0373) (0.0370) (0.0416) (0.0436) (0.0439) (0.0398) (0.0386) (0.0378) (0.0422) (0.0430) 
ROAA 0.524*** 0.530*** 0.581*** 0.576*** 0.584*** 0.537*** 0.549*** 0.545*** 0.549*** 0.551*** 
 (0.103) (0.106) (0.121) (0.124) (0.125) (0.128) (0.131) (0.135) (0.139) (0.139) 
LLRGL 0.203*** 0.208*** 0.166*** 0.178*** 0.191*** 0.220*** 0.228*** 0.193*** 0.205*** 0.214*** 
 (0.0469) (0.0479) (0.0479) (0.0488) (0.0498) (0.0518) (0.0537) (0.0527) (0.0544) (0.0556) 
BOONE 2.320*** 2.330*** 2.756*** 2.869*** 2.797*** 2.179*** 2.187*** 2.901*** 2.767*** 2.770*** 
 (0.750) (0.769) (0.740) (0.939) (0.953) (0.727) (0.748) (0.740) (0.944) (0.952) 
OCS 0.208*** 0.224*** 0.249*** 0.224*** 0.221*** 0.0850* 0.0948** 0.0708 0.0316 0.0401 
 (0.0460) (0.0462) (0.0591) (0.0610) (0.0604) (0.0483) (0.0479) (0.0611) (0.0638) (0.0640) 
OSP -0.0405 -0.0201 0.0113 0.0301 -0.000858 -0.0443 -0.0220 -0.0710 -0.0384 -0.0547 
 (0.0298) (0.0321) (0.0403) (0.0454) (0.0463) (0.0386) (0.0394) (0.0506) (0.0518) (0.0534) 
BACC 0.310** 0.389***  0.297 0.331* -0.135 -0.0451  -0.271 -0.185 
 (0.151) (0.147)  (0.185) (0.198) (0.166) (0.160)  (0.235) (0.239) 
MCM  0.00274*     0.00426***    
  (0.00149)     (0.00159)    
CF   -0.0181 -0.0219 -0.0166   -0.0199 -0.0131 -0.0103 
   (0.0168) (0.0173) (0.0178)   (0.0187) (0.0218) (0.0222) 
Cooperative     0.413     0.419 
     (0.261)     (0.285) 
Savings     1.174***     -0.423 
     (0.394)     (0.527) 
Cons 1.951** 0.928 2.806** 1.676 1.644 3.970*** 2.695* 4.846*** 5.399*** 5.043*** 
 (0.796) (1.002) (1.117) (1.190) (1.261) (1.325) (1.408) (1.446) (1.781) (1.801) 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 10632 10556 6880 6538 6538 7275 7199 5316 4974 4974 
Panels 3461 3440 2316 2193 2193 2930 2909 1885 1762 1762 
j 85 86 85 86 88 85 86 85 86 88 
Hansen 80.73 81.38 69.48 67.93 67.08 66.11 66.36 61.80 60.48 59.88 
Hansen-p 0.0772 0.0703 0.298 0.345 0.372 0.404 0.395 0.555 0.602 0.623 
AR1 -4.621 -4.617 -3.732 -3.645 -3.650 -4.359 -4.340 -3.700 -3.639 -3.641 
AR1-p 0.00000383 0.00000389 0.000190 0.000268 0.000262 0.0000131 0.0000143 0.000216 0.000274 0.000272 
AR2 1.725 1.730 0.979 0.975 0.960 1.557 1.557 0.748 0.724 0.714 
AR2p 0.0845 0.0836 0.328 0.330 0.337 0.119 0.120 0.454 0.469 0.475 
Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The Hansen is a test of the over-identifying restrictions for the GMM estimator. AR1 and AR2 are tests for the first-order and second-order serial correlation. N denotes number of observations, Ng number of banks and J number of instruments. Year denote 
if year dummy variables were introduced in the regressions. BUF(-1) is the lag of bank's capital buffer; SizeCo is a dummy variable that takes 1 if bank's size belongs to the top quartile in its national size distribution; ROAA is the return on assets; ROAE is the return on equity; LLRGL is the ratio of non-performing loans to 
total bank assets; BOONE is the competition index; CF is the cost of funding; OCS is an index that measures overall capital stringency; OSP is an index that measures regulatory authority power; BACC is a dummy for bank accounting; MCM is the ratio of money and quasi-money to GDP; and Cooperative and Savings are 
dummy variables that identify the type of bank. 
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Table 5. Estimation Results: Blundell-Bond Two-Step System GMM Estimates for Capital Buffers, 2001-2013 
 A. Whole sample B. Excluding US banks 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
BUF(-1) 0.543*** 0.543*** 0.473*** 0.467*** 0.467*** 0.555*** 0.554*** 0.465*** 0.457*** 0.456*** 
 (0.0794) (0.0792) (0.0878) (0.0876) (0.0871) (0.0866) (0.0872) (0.0897) (0.0884) (0.0882) 
SizeCo -0.929*** -0.933*** -1.183*** -1.071*** -1.115*** -1.145*** -1.156*** -1.752*** -1.629*** -1.575*** 
 (0.292) (0.293) (0.359) (0.362) (0.378) (0.325) (0.330) (0.397) (0.389) (0.393) 
GGDP -0.0918*** -0.0780*** -0.0797*** -0.0615** -0.0497 -0.0504* -0.0312 -0.0515* -0.0110 -0.00990 
 (0.0240) (0.0250) (0.0289) (0.0305) (0.0313) (0.0264) (0.0285) (0.0304) (0.0341) (0.0343) 
ROAA 0.490*** 0.499*** 0.532*** 0.542*** 0.549*** 0.476*** 0.485*** 0.512*** 0.539*** 0.538*** 
 (0.0947) (0.0962) (0.105) (0.106) (0.106) (0.106) (0.107) (0.118) (0.119) (0.119) 
LLRGL 0.176*** 0.182*** 0.209*** 0.232*** 0.241*** 0.185*** 0.191*** 0.245*** 0.271*** 0.272*** 
 (0.0437) (0.0443) (0.0589) (0.0602) (0.0608) (0.0477) (0.0492) (0.0637) (0.0648) (0.0656) 
Lerner -1.354* -0.270 0.763 -0.644 -0.298 -2.573*** -1.406* -0.358 -1.622 -1.446 
 (0.708) (0.805) (0.681) (0.881) (0.957) (0.766) (0.829) (0.743) (0.999) (1.072) 
OCS 0.268*** 0.260*** 0.277*** 0.286*** 0.268*** 0.119** 0.109** 0.105* 0.0610 0.0602 
 (0.0521) (0.0517) (0.0709) (0.0716) (0.0706) (0.0497) (0.0492) (0.0629) (0.0640) (0.0641) 
OSP -0.0595* -0.0169 -0.0266 0.0124 -0.0131 -0.0868** -0.0434 -0.128** -0.0769 -0.0788 
 (0.0317) (0.0339) (0.0438) (0.0458) (0.0468) (0.0407) (0.0393) (0.0514) (0.0498) (0.0510) 
BACC 0.221 0.284*  0.158 0.123 -0.159 -0.104  -0.502** -0.490** 
 (0.148) (0.147)  (0.194) (0.198) (0.165) (0.162)  (0.215) (0.218) 
MCM  0.00527***     0.00577***    
  (0.00167)     (0.00168)    
CF   -0.0383** -0.0377** -0.0314*   -0.0328* -0.0177 -0.0174 
   (0.0176) (0.0181) (0.0185)   (0.0196) (0.0228) (0.0227) 
Cooperative     0.326     0.139 
     (0.284)     (0.298) 
Savings     1.347***     -0.571 
     (0.403)     (0.477) 
Cons 2.724*** 1.131 2.992*** 2.004* 2.195* 5.111*** 3.477*** 5.288*** 6.451*** 6.361*** 
 (0.884) (0.966) (0.952) (1.166) (1.222) (1.277) (1.276) (1.167) (1.505) (1.552) 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 13124 13063 8289 7840 7840 9400 9339 6367 5918 5918 
Panels 3745 3739 2302 2182 2182 3206 3200 1863 1743 1743 
j 97 98 97 98 100 97 98 97 98 100 
Hansen 102.3 102.8 95.60 92.03 91.32 88.91 89.99 80.72 74.37 74.43 
Hansen-p 0.0237 0.0220 0.0638 0.102 0.111 0.148 0.130 0.334 0.532 0.529 
AR1 -5.320 -5.328 -4.158 -4.086 -4.095 -4.861 -4.833 -4.270 -4.213 -4.214 
AR1-p 0.000000104 9.91e-08 0.0000320 0.0000439 0.0000421 0.00000117 0.00000134 0.0000195 0.0000252 0.0000251 
AR2 1.273 1.262 0.352 0.347 0.318 0.975 0.961 -0.0536 -0.101 -0.106 
AR2p 0.203 0.207 0.725 0.728 0.750 0.330 0.336 0.957 0.919 0.916 
Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The Hansen is a test of the over-identifying restrictions for the GMM estimator. AR1 and AR2 are tests for the first-order and second-
order serial correlation. N denotes number of observations, Ng number of banks and J number of instruments. Year denote if year dummy variables were introduced in the regressions. BUF(-1) is the lag 
of bank's capital buffer; SizeCo is a dummy variable that takes 1 if bank's size belongs to the top quartile; ROAA is the return on assets; ROAE is the return on equity; LLRGL is the ratio of non-performing 
loans to total bank assets; Lerner is the market power index; CF is the cost of funding; OCS is an index that measures overall capital stringency; OSP is an index that measures regulatory authority power; 
BACC is a dummy for bank accounting; MCM is the ratio of money and quasi-money to GDP; and Cooperative and Savings are dummy variables that identify the type of bank. 
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Table 6. Estimation Results: Blundell-Bond Two-Step System GMM Estimates for Capital Buffers, 2001-2013 
 A. Whole sample B. Excluding US banks 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
BUF(-1) 0.555*** 0.558*** 0.386*** 0.395*** 0.395*** 0.555*** 0.559*** 0.398*** 0.405*** 0.404*** 
 (0.0671) (0.0662) (0.0745) (0.0790) (0.0787) (0.0792) (0.0791) (0.0722) (0.0764) (0.0763) 
SizeCo -0.972*** -0.958*** -1.507*** -1.449*** -1.452*** -1.190*** -1.175*** -1.985*** -1.879*** -1.772*** 
 (0.265) (0.259) (0.329) (0.350) (0.360) (0.310) (0.306) (0.347) (0.359) (0.351) 
GGDP -0.0910*** -0.0633*** -0.0495 -0.0570* -0.0357 -0.0577** -0.0275 -0.0111 0.00755 0.0192 
 (0.0223) (0.0244) (0.0323) (0.0321) (0.0344) (0.0252) (0.0280) (0.0339) (0.0357) (0.0383) 
ROAA 0.415*** 0.436*** 0.483*** 0.485*** 0.492*** 0.399*** 0.418*** 0.427*** 0.441*** 0.442*** 
 (0.0883) (0.0916) (0.115) (0.117) (0.117) (0.105) (0.109) (0.123) (0.126) (0.126) 
LLRGL 0.178*** 0.188*** 0.218*** 0.233*** 0.247*** 0.188*** 0.195*** 0.251*** 0.260*** 0.268*** 
 (0.0425) (0.0434) (0.0601) (0.0612) (0.0614) (0.0469) (0.0479) (0.0641) (0.0644) (0.0653) 
5-conc 0.00607 0.00338 0.00124 -0.00496 -0.00205 0.0258*** 0.0227*** 0.0298*** 0.0272*** 0.0279*** 
 (0.00532) (0.00565) (0.00767) (0.00902) (0.00896) (0.00611) (0.00611) (0.00872) (0.00993) (0.00998) 
OCS 0.252*** 0.259*** 0.317*** 0.263*** 0.262*** 0.100** 0.104** 0.106 0.0670 0.0753 
 (0.0497) (0.0500) (0.0741) (0.0766) (0.0774) (0.0508) (0.0512) (0.0689) (0.0734) (0.0739) 
OSP -0.0382 -0.0114 -0.0373 -0.00177 -0.0299 -0.0501 -0.0227 -0.0566 -0.0452 -0.0591 
 (0.0365) (0.0363) (0.0542) (0.0546) (0.0562) (0.0395) (0.0389) (0.0535) (0.0546) (0.0573) 
BACC 0.200 0.322**  0.195 0.221 -0.304* -0.165  -0.598*** -0.525** 
 (0.144) (0.143)  (0.204) (0.218) (0.159) (0.153)  (0.229) (0.231) 
MCM  0.00468***     0.00505***    
  (0.00158)     (0.00156)    
CF   -0.0451** -0.0455** -0.0390**   -0.0367* -0.0212 -0.0188 
   (0.0182) (0.0188) (0.0189)   (0.0197) (0.0227) (0.0231) 
Cooperative     0.420     0.393 
     (0.302)     (0.315) 
Savings     1.482***     -0.520 
     (0.444)     (0.496) 
Cons 1.930 0.643 3.940*** 3.254** 2.966* 2.913** 1.581 2.842** 4.766*** 4.394*** 
 (1.214) (1.234) (1.313) (1.577) (1.608) (1.427) (1.468) (1.236) (1.618) (1.632) 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 13515 13374 8686 8226 8226 9791 9650 6764 6304 6304 
Panels 3818 3791 2421 2296 2296 3279 3252 1982 1857 1857 
j 97 98 97 98 100 97 98 97 98 100 
Hansen 87.50 87.97 100.7 97.01 95.41 82.07 82.67 85.68 80.37 79.73 
Hansen-p 0.173 0.164 0.0307 0.0524 0.0655 0.297 0.281 0.210 0.344 0.362 
AR1 -5.729 -5.762 -3.949 -3.844 -3.851 -5.052 -5.065 -4.246 -4.113 -4.108 
AR1-p 1.01e-08 8.32e-09 0.0000786 0.000121 0.000118 0.000000436 0.000000408 0.0000218 0.0000391 0.0000399 
AR2 1.615 1.648 0.724 0.740 0.715 1.363 1.389 0.420 0.397 0.383 
AR2p 0.106 0.0993 0.469 0.459 0.475 0.173 0.165 0.675 0.691 0.701 
Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The Hansen is a test of the over-identifying restrictions for the GMM estimator. AR1 and AR2 are tests for the first-order and second-
order serial correlation. N denotes number of observations, Ng number of banks and J number of instruments. Year denote if year dummy variables were introduced in the regressions. BUF(-1) is the lag 
of bank's capital buffer; SizeCo is a dummy variable that takes 1 if bank's size belongs to the top quartile; ROAA is the return on assets; ROAE is the return on equity; LLRGL is the ratio of non-performing 
loans to total bank assets; 5-conc is the market share of total assets held by the 5 largest banks; CF is the cost of funding; OCS is an index that measures overall capital stringency; OSP is an index that 
measures regulatory authority power; BACC is a dummy for bank accounting; MCM is the ratio of money and quasi-money to GDP; and Cooperative and Savings are dummy variables that identify the 
type of bank.  
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Figures  
 
 
 
Figure 1: Bank capital buffers and GDP growth by sub-regions (in percentages) 
 
     Developed                                                                                          Developing 
 Averages at sub-regions level. Own calculations based on initial data from 7,090 banks, from 106 developing and 37 developed countries. 
 
Figure 2: Bank capital buffers at time t-1 versus capital buffers at time t 
 
 
Own calculations based on initial data from 7,090 banks, from 106 developing and 37 developed countries.  
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Appendix A: Technical note, the Boone and Lerner indicators 
 
 
The Boone Indicator 
The measure of competition used in this paper is the Boone indicator. The Boone index model is based on the idea 
that competition enhances the performance of efficient banks and weakens less efficient ones. This effect is stronger the 
more competitive a given market is. Boone (2001, 2008) shows that more efficient banks with lower marginal costs gain 
higher market shares. The Boone indicator is estimated by using the following empirical model: 
ittTt tittTt tit
DmcDms     )1(,....,1)1(,....,1 )ln()ln(   
Where 𝑚𝑠 and 𝑚𝑐 denote, respectively, market shares and marginal costs in the loans market. To measure the 
evolution of competition over time, time dummies, D, can be included. it is the disturbance term. The coefficient 
denotes the Boone indicator. Market shares increase for banks with lower marginal costs (i.e.,  <0). There is an alternative 
formulation that measures the elasticity of a bank’s profits to changes in marginal costs, with a similar interpretation. 
More competition raises the market share of a more efficient bank relative to a less efficient one. A larger negative 
value of  is an indication of more competitive conditions. However, positive values of  are also possible, implying 
either that the market has an extreme level of collusion or that banks are competing on quality. 
 
The Lerner Index 
The Lerner index is a bank-level alternative measure of market power, used for robustness purposes in our 
empirical exercise. It is positively correlated with market power. It is averaged at the country level. It can be defined as the 
difference between marginal price and marginal cost divided by marginal price, as follows:  
it
itit
it
P
MCP
Lerner

                            
where itP is the average price of output, and itMC  is the marginal cost of producing this output. 
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Appendix B 
 
Table B: Variables description 
Variable  Description  Source 
 
Dependent variable: 
  
Buffer (BUF) 
Following Jokipii and Milne (2008), we define the 
capital buffer as the bank capital ratio less the Minimum 
Capital Ratio (MCR). The bank capital ratio is 
approximated by the Total Capital Ratio (TCR), which 
measures the actual regulatory capital ratio in each 
jurisdiction. 
TCR: Bankscope. 
MCR: WB database “The Regulation of 
Banks around the World”, surveys I, II, III 
and IV. Barth et al. (2001, 2004, 2006, 
2012).  
   
Banks’ variables:   
   
Bank size (Size) Logarithm of bank’s total assets. Bankscope. 
   
Top quartile biggest 
banks (SizeCo) 
Dummy variable that takes 1 if the bank size belongs to 
the top quartile in their national size distribution. 
Bankscope. 
   
Return Over Average 
Assets (ROAA) 
Measured as Net Income/Average Total Assets Bankscope. 
   
Return Over Average 
Equity (ROAE) 
Measured as the ratio of net income to average total 
equity. 
Bankscope. 
   
   
Loan Loss Reserve  Gross 
Loans (LLRGL) 
Measured as the ratio of non-performing loans to total 
bank assets.  
Bankscope. 
   
Cost of Funding (CF) 
Measured as the ratio of interest expenses to total 
funding. 
Bankscope. 
   
Country variables:   
   
Boone Indicator 
(BOONE) 
 
Measure of competition used in this paper, based on 
profit-efficiency in the banking market. It is calculated as 
the elasticity of profits to marginal costs. An increase in 
the Boone indicator implies a deterioration of the 
competitive conduct of financial intermediaries. See 
Appendix A for technical details. 
 
World Bank/ Global Financial 
Development. 
http://data.worldbank.org/data-
catalog/global-financial-development 
 
Lerner Index (Lerner) 
Measure of market power in the banking market. It 
compares output pricing and marginal costs (that is, 
markup). An increase in the Lerner index indicates a 
deterioration of the competitive conduct of financial 
intermediaries. Country average. 
World Bank/ Global Financial 
Development. 
http://data.worldbank.org/data-
catalog/global-financial-development 
 
Concentration (5-conc)  
 
Measure of concentration based on the total assets of five 
largest banks as a share of total commercial banking 
assets. Total assets include total earning assets, cash and 
due from banks, foreclosed real estate, fixed assets, 
goodwill, other intangibles, current tax assets, deferred 
tax, discontinued operations and other assets. 
 
World Bank/ Global Financial 
Development. 
http://data.worldbank.org/data-
catalog/global-financial-development 
 
Overall Capital 
Stringency (OCS) 
Index that measures the extent of regulatory 
requirements regarding the amount of capital banks must 
hold. Higher values indicate greater stringency. 
WB database “The Regulation of Banks 
around the World”, surveys I, II, III and 
IV. Barth et al. (2001, 2004, 2006, 2012). 
   
Official Supervisory 
Power (OSP) 
Index that measures the extent to which official 
supervisory authorities have the authority to take specific 
actions to prevent and correct problems. Higher values 
indicating greater power. 
WB database “The Regulation of Banks 
around the World”, surveys I, II, III and 
IV. Barth et al. (2001, 2004, 2006, 2012). 
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Variable  Description  Source 
Bank Accounting 
(BACC) 
Dummy variable that takes a value of 1 when the income 
statement includes accrued or unpaid interest or principal 
on nonperforming loans and when banks are required to 
produce consolidated financial statements and zero 
otherwise. 
WB database “The Regulation of Banks 
around the World”, surveys I, II, III and 
IV. Barth et al. (2001, 2004, 2006, 2012). 
   
   
Growth rate of Gross 
Domestic Product  
(GGDP) 
 
Growth rate of Gross Domestic Product. Our measure of 
the business cycle.  
World Bank/ World Development 
Indicators.  
http://data.worldbank.org/data-
catalog/world-development-indicators  
 
   
Money and Quasi Money 
(MCM) 
 
 
Money and Quasi Money (M2) as percentage of GDP. 
World Bank/ Global Financial 
Development. 
http://data.worldbank.org/data-
catalog/global-financial-development 
 
   
Notes: The construction of the regulatory variables are explained in detail by Barth, Caprio and Levine (2004).  
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Appendix C  
 
Table C: Country and bank representativeness in the sample in Table 2’s baseline regressions 
 
Countries and Banks 
  
Initial dataset 
Specification 
1 
Specification 
2 
Specification 
3 
Specification 
4 
Specification 
5 
Total banks 7,090 3,461 3,440 2,316 2,193 2,193 
N° of developing countries  106 54 53 55 54 54 
N° of developed countries  37 25 25 26 25 25 
N° of developing countries' banks 2,157 1,011 996 906 901 901 
N° of obs. developing in sample 11,188 3,146 3,104 2,567 2,560 2,560 
N° of developed countries' banks 4,933 2,450 2,444 1,410 1,292 1,292 
N° of obs. developed in sample 28,908 7,486 7,452 4,313 3,978 3,978 
N° of developed countries' banks (Non-US 
banks) 
4,124 1,919 1,913 979 861 861 
N° of obs. developed in sample (Non-US) 22,443 4,129 4,095 2,749 2,414 2,414 
Average T for developed countries' banks  5.860 3.056 3.049 3.059 3.079 3.079 
Average T for developed countries' banks (Non-
US banks) 
5.442 2.152 2.141 2.808 2.804 2.804 
Average T for developing countries' banks 5.187 3.112 3.116 2.833 2.841 2.841 
 
 
